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ABSTRACT  
   
This study investigates the impact of portfolio disclosure on hedge fund 
performance. Using a regression discontinuity design, I investigate the effect of 
the disclosure requirements that take effect when an investment company's assets 
exceed $100 million; when that occurs, a fund is required by the SEC to submit 
form 13F disclosing its portfolio holdings. Consistent with the argument that 
portfolio disclosure reveals "trade secrets" and also raises front running costs thus 
harms the funds that disclose, I find that there is a drop in fund performance 
(about 4% annually) after a fund begins filing form 13F, as well as an increase in 
return correlations with other hedge funds in the same investment style. The drop 
in performance cannot be explained by a change in the assets under management 
or a mean reversion in returns. Consistent with the idea that funds with illiquid 
holdings tend to employ sequential trading strategies, which increase the 
likelihood of being taken advantage of by free riders and front runners, the drop in 
performance is more dramatic for funds that have more illiquid holdings. In 
addition, I find that the incentive fees paid to fund managers are 1% higher when 
portfolio disclosure is required, which supports the hypothesis that investors' 
monitoring of portfolio holdings disciplines adverse risk-taking by fund managers 
and allows for higher convexity in the optimal compensation structure. Finally, 
there is a drop in flows into funds that file 13F, which suggests that hedge fund 
investors negatively value 13F disclosure. Overall, this study suggests that the 
cost of portfolio disclosure is economically large. It contributes to the policy 
debate over what constitutes optimal disclosure. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Determining the extent to which investment portfolios should be publicly 
disclosed is a basic challenge facing hedge fund industry participants and 
regulators. Portfolio disclosure is beneficial to the extent that it allows investors to 
make informed investment allocation decisions and reduces potential agency costs 
that can arise when managerial actions are more opaque. Portfolio disclosure, 
however, is costly if it reveals proprietary information and facilitates free-riding 
activities by others on a fund's profitable investments and trading strategies.1
                                               
1 Poterba, Shackelford, and Shoven (2004) demonstrate that hypothetical 
“copycat" funds created by mimicking the portfolio holdings of actively managed 
mutual funds earn after expense returns that are indistinguishable from the copied 
funds. 
 In 
this study, I investigate the effect of the portfolio disclosure requirements that 
take effect when an investment company's assets exceed $100 million; when that 
occurs, hedge fund and other institutional managers are required by the SEC to 
file form 13F reporting their quarterly holdings within 45 days after the end of 
each quarter. This discontinuous change in disclosure regimes around the $100 
million threshold allows for the use of a regression discontinuity approach and the 
identification of a causal effect of portfolio disclosure on hedge fund performance 
that is purged of potential endogeneity problems. The identifying assumption is 
that the function that relates fund size to performance does not have precisely the 
same jumps as the function that relates fund size to disclosure. This procedure is 
valid even if unobserved factors that affect performance (such as a fund manager's 
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skills) are functionally related to fund size. 
Using a complete sample of 4,024 hedge fund managers that report to 
TASS over the period of February 1977 to February 2010, among which 414 have 
led Form 13F at least once, I find that fund performance is lower in the disclosure 
periods than in the non-disclosure periods. The results are robust to five 
performance measures, including raw returns, market model alpha, Fama-French 
three-factor alpha, Carhart four-factor alpha, and Fung-Hsieh seven-factor alpha. 
The cost of performance disclosure is economically large. For example, when 
measured by the Fama-French three-factor alpha, the performance is 4% lower 
(annually) during the disclosure periods. I also find that the drop in performance 
does not occur slowly over time; instead, it occurs in the form of a “sudden” drop 
in the first year after a fund files its first 13F disclosure. This finding of a 
‘discontinuous’ drop in performance along the time dimension lends strong 
support to the argument that the decreased performance is due to portfolio 
disclosure. 
Using a regression discontinuity design where samples are narrowed to a 
small neighborhood around the $100 million threshold, I find that there is a drop 
in fund performance that occurs in the form of a discontinuous ‘jump’ and that it 
cannot be explained by continuous changes in the assets under management when 
the regulatory regime switches from non-disclosure to disclosure. In addition, I 
find that there is no such discontinuous drop in performance for funds that also 
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crossed the $100 million threshold but were not required to file 13F.2
In support of the hypothesis that the decreased performance in the periods 
of portfolio disclosure is due to free-riding activities by other fund managers, I 
find that the return correlations between disclosing funds and other hedge funds 
that are in the same investment style are greater in the disclosure periods than in 
the non-disclosure periods.  This finding supports the idea that other funds take 
positions more similar to disclosing funds after disclosing funds disclose their 
portfolio holdings or that incentives to pursue novel strategies diminish following 
disclosure.  
 
Furthermore, there is no drop in fund performance when funds crossed other 
thresholds (e.g., $80 million or $120 million). These results confirm that the drop 
in performance following disclosure is not due to change in size or mean 
reversion in returns. 
I also investigate the extent to which the liquidity of portfolio holdings 
affects the cost of disclosure.  In general, trades in illiquid securities result in 
larger price impacts than trades in liquid securities.  In order to reduce the 
transaction cost due to price impact, fund managers tend to employ sequential 
trading strategies to accumulate or dispose of an illiquid position. However, the 
longer it takes to accumulate or dispose of a position, the higher the likelihood 
and greater the cost of being taken advantage of by frontrunners and free riders. 
Consistent with these observations, I find that the drop in performance is more 
                                               
2The fact that these large funds are not required to file 13F is because they hold 
non-13(f) securities, short positions, or securities that are less than 10,000 shares 
or with market value less than $200,000. 
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dramatic for funds with illiquid holdings.   
Disclosure is intended to improve monitoring and reduce agency 
problems. One of the main agency problems facing hedge fund investors is that 
managers may take on excessive risk, especially given the prevailing option-like 
“bonus" incentive fee.3 Under “bonus" incentive fees, hedge fund managers 
receive a fixed percentage of fund profit but are not penalized when they incur 
losses. Thus, hedge fund managers do not suffer any downside risk. Unlike the 
time series of past fund returns, which provide a very limited view of fund risk, 4
Finally, whether hedge fund investors value 13F portfolio disclosure is 
still an open question. While investors may prefer more disclosure for the 
 
portfolio disclosure allows investors to observe the holdings and assess the risk 
that they are exposed to. Their monitoring of portfolio holdings may discipline 
risk taking by fund managers and reduce the convexity of the incentive fees. 
Consistent with this argument that portfolio disclosure allows higher convexity in 
the optimal compensation structure, I find that incentive fees are 1% higher in the 
presence of portfolio disclosure, after controlling for other factors such as assets 
under management and age of the fund families.  
                                               
3Starks (1987) and Grinblatt and Titman (1989) show in theoretical models that 
managers have incentives to choose greater risks than the desired risk level by the 
clients under option like incentive fees. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) show 
empirically that higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) 
implements riskier policy choices. Golec and Starks (2004) find that an 
exogenous change in incentive fees reduces mutual fund managers' risk taking. 
 
4See Stulz (2007) for a discussion on “earthquake" risks that can't be detected 
from past performance. 
 
5See Healy and Palepu (2001) for a review of empirical disclosure literature. 
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increased transparency it affords, they may prefer less disclosure if it leads to 
lower fund performance.  The value that investors attach to the 13F disclosure can 
be measured by the fund flows in and out of the funds.  I find that flows are lower 
in the periods of disclosure than in non-disclosure periods. The test for this 
controls for the change in flows that might be expected in response to other 
factors, such as changes in past performance (Berk and Green, 2004).  My finding 
suggests that hedge fund investors place a negative value on 13F portfolio 
disclosure.   
This study is related to a broader literature on financial information 
disclosure.5 There are several advantages of using hedge funds as a laboratory to 
examine issues related to disclosure.  First, the proprietary cost of disclosure is 
plausibly more important for hedge fund managers.  Hedge funds are relatively 
unfettered in their ability to use leverage, derivatives, and short sales across 
several asset classes.  This structure might attract talented managers with 
sophisticated trading strategies. Second, hedge funds often utilize lockup 
provisions and hold illiquid assets, practices that suggest they are also more likely 
to use dynamic trading strategies. Disclosure especially undermines the 
profitability of these strategies. Third, the extent of disclosure, firm performance, 
and the value investors attach to the disclosure policy can be directly and easily 
measured in the context of portfolio disclosure. In contrast, the difficulty of 
measuring the extent of disclosure has constrained research in the area of financial 
information disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
This study provides direct evidence that portfolio disclosure harms hedge 
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fund performance and suggests that the cost of disclosure is economically large. 
This finding is supported by Aragon, Hertzel, and Shi (2009) and by Agarwal, 
Jiang, Tang, and Yang's (2009), who demonstrate that hedge fund managers 
request confidential treatment to delay 13F disclosure of their profitable ideas. 
This study is also in line with the finding of Ge and Zheng (2006) that past 
“winner" mutual funds that disclose less frequently outperform those that disclose 
more frequently. 
This study is also the first to analyze the interactions between portfolio 
disclosure and compensation structure in the investment fund industry. A fund 
manager's adverse risk-taking incentive is similar to the risk-shifting incentive of 
an equity holder to expropriate wealth from existing bondholders. My finding that 
incentive fees are higher in the presence of portfolio disclosure is similar to John, 
Mehran, and Qian's (2008) finding that the pay-for-performance sensitivity of 
CEO compensation increases with the intensity of outside monitoring of the firm's 
risk choice, though their focus is not on the convexity of the compensation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes 
the data. Section III discusses the methodology and empirical results. Section IV 
concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DATA 
Institutional Investment Managers and Form 13F 
Since 1978, all institutional investment managers (including hedge fund 
managers) who exercise investment discretion over $100 million or more have 
been required by Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act to make quarterly disclosures 
of portfolio holdings to the SEC on form 13F. Form 13F must be filed with the 
SEC no later than 45 days after the end of each calendar quarter. The types of 
securities that are reported on form 13F include exchange-traded and NASDAQ-
quoted stocks, equity options and warrants, convertible bonds, and shares of 
closed-end investment companies. All long positions in such securities with more 
than 10,000 shares or with a market value exceeding $200,000 are required to be 
reported. Information reported on form 13F includes the issuers of the securities, 
the security type, the CUSIP number, the number of shares, and the market value 
of each security owned. Managers are allowed to report aggregated holdings for 
different funds managed by the same management company. 
Sample Selection 
The Lipper/TASS hedge fund database provides monthly fund returns and 
assets under management, a snapshot of fund characteristics, and the management 
company/investment advisor voluntarily reported by hedge funds. The TASS 
hedge fund database reports data beginning in February 1977, and the most recent 
download covers data to February 2010. At that time there were 13,845 funds, 
including 5,861 live funds and 7,984 dead funds. A total of 4,024 management 
  8 
companies/investment advisors are listed in the TASS database and each 
management company can manage multiple funds. 
 
The Thomson-Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings dataset provides 
quarterly holdings by institutional investors that are obligated to file form 13F 
with the SEC. The Thomson-Reuters dataset starts from the first quarter of 1980, 
and the most recent downloads cover holdings until the last quarter of 2009. In 
order to identify investment companies that manage hedge funds, I first compile a 
list of hedge fund company names using the Company file in the TASS Hedge 
Fund datasets downloaded in February 2009. This yields a total of 4,024 
investment companies that manage hedge funds. I then hand matched these hedge 
fund company names with company names in the Thomson-Reuters Institutional 
(13f) Holdings dataset. There are a total of 414 investment companies matched. 
Dates on Which Funds Start or Stop Filing Form 13F 
The first quarter that a company has fling records in the Thomson (13f) 
dataset is identified as the quarter that an investment company starts to file form 
13F. Similarly, the last quarter that a company has filing records in Thomson 
(13f) is identified as the quarter that an investment company stops filing form 
13F. 
 
Table 1 lists the number of investment companies that began filing form 13F 
(and were added to the database of 13F filing companies) each year from 1980 to 
2009 in column 1 and the number of investment companies that stopped filing 
form 13F (and were dropped from the 13F list) in column 2. As shown in column 
1, the number of investment companies added to the 13F list increased over the 
first half of the sample period and peaked in year 1999. It stayed roughly stable in 
the second half of the sample period and dropped in year 2008. Table 2 reports the 
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distribution of the length of 13F filing periods. The majority of the investment 
companies have a filing period of between 2 years and 10 years. There are three 
investment companies that have a filing period of over 20 years. 
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Table 1. The Number of Companies Added or Dropped from the List of 13F 
Filing Companies 
 
This table reports the number of investment companies that began filing form 13F 
(added to the list of 13F Filing companies) each year from 1980 to 2009 in 
column 1 and the number of investment companies that ceased filing form 13F 
(and were dropped from the list of 13F companies) in column 2. The first quarter 
that a company has filing records in the Thomson (13f) dataset is identified as the 
quarter that an investment company starts to file form 13F, excluding the 
beginning of the Thomson (13f) dataset, which is the first quarter of year 1980.  
Similarly, the last quarter that a company has filing records in Thomson (13f) is 
identified as the quarter that an investment company stops filing form 13F, 
excluding the last date of the Thomson (13f) data download, which is the last 
quarter of year 2009.  
 
Year 
 # of Companies That  
Begin Filing 13F 
 # of Companies That  
Cease Filing 13F 
1980  1  0 
1981  1  0 
1982  1  0 
1983  1  0 
1984  0  0 
1985  1  0 
1986  0  0 
1987  2  0 
1991  3  0 
1992  1  0 
1993  3  0 
1994  3  1 
1995  5  2 
1996  2  0 
1997  12  1 
1998  17  30 
1999  58  6 
2000  35  17 
2001  12  11 
2002  28  10 
2003  41  11 
2004  28  14 
2005  44  18 
2006  43  26 
2007  43  31 
2008  29  50 
2009  0  18 
Total  414  246 
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Table 2. The Length of 13F Filing Periods 
 
This table reports the distribution of the length of the 13F filing periods.    
 
Length of 13F Filing Period # of Investment Companies 
1 quarter 24 
2 quarters to 1 Year 52 
2 to 5 Years 207 
6 to 10 Years 101 
10 to 15 Years 26 
15 to 20 Years 1 
>= 20 Years 3 
Total 414 
 
  12 
CHAPTER 3 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The Impact of 13F Disclosure on Hedge Fund Performance 
Hedge Fund Performance Before and During 13F Portfolio Disclosure 
In this section, I use univariate tests to investigate whether portfolio 
disclosure harms hedge fund performance. Only those fund families that have 
return data in TASS before and during 13F portfolio disclosure are included in the 
analysis. The statistical significance of the difference in performance between 
disclosure and non-disclosure periods is obtained using a paired t-test. As shown 
in Table 3, hedge fund performance is worse in disclosure periods than in non-
disclosure periods. The results are robust to five performance measures including 
raw returns, market model alpha, Fama-French three-factor alpha, Carhart four-
factor alpha, and Fung-Hsieh seven-factor alpha. The differences in performance 
are both statistically and economically significant. For example, the Fung-Hsieh 
seven-factor model alpha is 0.399% lower per month (4.788% annually) during 
the 13F disclosure period. 
Risk-Adjusted Performance of Calendar Time Portfolio 
I investigate whether a calendar time portfolio which long disclosed funds 
and short non-disclosed funds earns abnormal risk-adjusted returns.  In each 
month t, a fund family is classified as “disclosed” if it files 13F in month t-1, 
otherwise it is classified as “non-disclosed”.  Only the fund families that file 13F 
at least once during the sample period are included in the analysis.  Table 4 
reports raw returns and risk adjusted performance including market model alpha, 
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Fama-French three-factor alpha, Carhart four-factor alpha, and Fung-Hsieh seven-
factor alpha of the calendar time portfolio.  As shown in the table, raw returns and 
alphas obtained from the four risk models are all negative and statistically 
significant. For example, the alpha based on Fung-Hsieh seven-factor model is -
0.283% monthly (3.396% annually).  These results suggest that disclosed funds 
underperformance non-disclosed funds by about 3.4% annually.  
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Table 3. Hedge Fund Performance Before and During 13F Portfolio Disclosure 
 
This table reports the results of univariate tests on hedge fund performance before 
and during 13F portfolio disclosure.  The statistical significance on the difference 
in performance is obtained using paired t-tests.  
 
 
  Before 13F Filing   During 13F Filing   Difference 
 
n mean sd 
 
n mean sd 
 
Paired-t test 
Raw Returns (%) 152 1.098**** 0.779 
 
152 0.529**** 0.886 
 
-0.569 **** 
 
Market Model 
Alpha (%) 152 0.654**** 0.730 
 
152 0.261**** 0.777 
 
-0.393 **** 
Beta-Market 152 0.299**** 0.430 
 
152 0.393**** 0.450 
 
0.093 *** 
Adj R-squared 152 0.202 0.226 
 
152 0.272 0.250 
 
  0.070 *** 
 
Fama-French 3 Factor Model 
Alpha (%) 152 0.594**** 0.697 
 
152 0.215*** 0.838 
 
-0.379 **** 
Beta-Market 152 0.285**** 0.426 
 
152 0.388**** 0.421 
 
0.103 *** 
Beta-SMB 152 0.206**** 0.272 
 
152 0.115**** 0.325 
 
-0.091 *** 
Beta-HML 152 0.137**** 0.358 
 
152 -0.020 0.446 
 
-0.158 **** 
R-squared (Adj) 152 0.276 0.248 
 
152 0.340 0.266 
 
0.063 *** 
 
Fama-French 4 Factor Model 
Alpha (%) 152 0.561 0.709 
 
152 0.175*** 0.812 
 
-0.386 **** 
Beta-Market 152 0.283**** 0.414 
 
152 0.389**** 0.430 
 
0.106 *** 
Beta-SMB 152 0.193**** 0.312 
 
152 0.125**** 0.327 
 
-0.068 ** 
Beta-HML 152 0.155**** 0.366 
 
152 0.002 0.427 
 
-0.154 **** 
Beta-Momentum 152 0.030 0.272 
 
152 0.026 0.256 
 
-0.004 
 
R-squared (Adj) 152 0.306 0.251 
 
152 0.370 0.262 
 
  0.064 *** 
 
Fung and Hsieh 7 Factor Model 
Alpha (%) 152 0.720 0.792 
 
152 0.321 0.910 
 
-0.399 **** 
Beta-Bond Trend-Following 152 -0.004 0.061 
 
152 -0.010* 0.069 
 
-0.006 
 
Beta-Currency Trend-Following 152 0.006 0.050 
 
152 0.007** 0.043 
 
0.002 
 
Beta-Commodity Trend-Following 152 0.004 0.054 
 
152 0.011** 0.060 
 
0.008 
 
Beta-S&P 500 152 0.249**** 0.433 
 
152 0.291**** 0.461 
 
0.042 
 
Beta-SC-LC 152 0.184**** 0.319 
 
152 0.049*** 0.185 
 
-0.135 
 
Beta-10-year Treasury Yield 152 -0.648 4.893 
 
152 -0.086 3.869 
 
1.481 
 
Beta-Credit Spread 152 -1.567** 8.350 
 
152 -3.043**** 6.806 
 
-2.395 
 
R-squared (Adj) 152 0.244 0.278 
 
152 0.333 0.288 
 
0.089 *** 
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Table 4. Calendar Time Portfolios 
 
This table reports raw and risk-adjusted returns for a calendar time portfolio that longs disclosed funds and shorts non-disclosed funds.  
In month t, a fund family is classified as “disclosed” if it files 13F in month t-1, otherwise it is classified as “non-disclosed”.   
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Raw Return Market Model FF-3Factor Model Carhart 4 Factor Model Fung-Hsieh 7 Factor Model 
Constant -0.00313** -0.00330*** -0.00226** -0.00231** -0.00283** 
 (-2.34) (-2.74) (-2.24) (-2.23) (-2.12) 
Market  0.147**** 0.0767*** 0.0799**  
  (3.68) (2.71) (2.27)  
SMB   -0.00912 -0.0117  
   (-0.29) (-0.35)  
HML   -0.159**** -0.158****  
   (-4.66) (-4.56)  
Momentum    0.00624  
    (0.31)  
Bond Trend-Following     0.00335 
     (0.48) 
Currency Trend-Following     0.00220 
     (0.51) 
Commodity Trend-Following     0.00324 
     (0.49) 
S&P 500     0.122*** 
     (3.24) 
SC_LC     -0.000885 
     (-0.52) 
Credit Spread     -0.741 
     (-0.52) 
10-year Treasury Yield     -0.0211 
     (-0.04) 
      
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 
Adjusted R-squared  0.284 0.475 0.471 0.173 
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Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design 
The discontinuous change in the disclosure regime that takes effect when 
investment companies' assets cross the $100 million threshold allows me to 
identify an effect of portfolio disclosure on hedge fund performance that is purged 
of potential endogeneity problems. I employ a regression discontinuity design in 
which the identifying assumption is that the function that relates fund size to 
performance does not have precisely the same jumps as the function that relates 
fund size to disclosure. This procedure is valid even if unobserved factors such as 
fund manager skill that affect performance are functionally related to fund size. I 
narrow the sample to a small neighborhood around the $100 million threshold and 
use model below to detect whether there is a jump in performance when the 
disclosure requirement changes. Specifically, I keep the fund-year observations 
that have a lagged fund size greater than $70 million and less than $130 million. 
The results are robust to various width of the neighborhood such as $90 million to 
$110 million and $80 million to $120 million. 
tititititi SizeSizeDisclosureePerformanc ,
2
1,21,1,, εγγβα +++⋅+= −−  
where Performancei;t is a performance measure for fund family i in year t. 
Performancei;t is equal to 0 if year t is before investment company i begins filing 
form 13F, and is equal to 1 if year t is during the period that investment company 
files form 13F. The coefficient on Disclosurei;t captures whether there is a jump in 
performance when the disclosure code changes from 0 to 1. Both linear and 
quadratic terms of lagged assets under management are included in the model to 
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control for the effect of fund size on fund performance. Using samples only in the 
small neighborhood of $100 million also allows the results to be less dependent 
on the model specifications, such as the quadratic relation between size and 
performance. 
As shown in columns (1), (3), (5), (7), and (9) in Panel A of Table 5, the 
coefficient on Disclosurei;t is negative and statistically significant across all three 
performance measures. There is a drop in performance that occurs in the form of a 
discontinuous jump that cannot be explained by continuous changes in assets 
under management when the regulatory regime switches from non-disclosure to 
disclosure. 
There are also funds in TASS that have crossed the threshold of $100 
million but were not required to file 13F because some or all of their assets are not 
13(f) securities, are short positions, contain fewer than 10,000 shares, or have a 
market value of less than $200,000. These non-13F filing funds provide the 
opportunity for a control test. If the drop in performance is due to 13F disclosure, 
we should not observe a discontinuous drop in performance for this control group 
when they cross the $100 million threshold. As shown in columns (2), (4), (6), 
(8), and (10) in Panel A of Table 5, the coefficient on variable Disclosurei;t is not 
significantly different from zero, which suggests that there is no drop in 
performance for funds that crossed the $100 million threshold but did not file 13F 
disclosure. 
I also investigate whether there is a discontinuous drop when funds cross 
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other thresholds (e.g., $70 million or $130 million). If the drop in performance 
when funds crossed the $100 million threshold is due to 13F disclosure, we 
should not observe drops in performance when funds cross other thresholds. As 
shown in Panel B of Table 5, the coefficient on Dummyi;t is not statistically 
different from zero when using the threshold of $70 million or $130 million. 
These results confirm that the drop in performance following disclosure is not due 
to a change in size or mean reversion in returns. 
To address the concern that the yearly performance measure alphas 
estimated with twelve monthly return observations may not be very reliable due to 
the limitation of the sample size, I scaled each alpha estimate by its standard error 
and then run tests identical to those reported in Panels A and B and the results are 
reported in Panels C and D.  By scaling the alpha estimate by its standard error, I 
give greater weight to the alpha estimates which are relative more precise.  As 
shown in Panel C and Panel D, the results are qualitatively similar.   
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Table 5. Regression Discontinuity Design 
 
This table reports the results of regression discontinuity (RD) design with samples narrowed to a small neighborhood around the 
threshold  of $ 1 0 0  million (δ is chosen to  rep resent $ 3 0  million).  In Panel A, funds that filed 13F during the sample period are 
included in the analysis in model (1), (3), (5), (7), and (9). Performancei,t is a performance measure for fund family i in year t.  I use 
five different performance measures in my analysis: raw returns, market model alpha, Fama-French three-factor model alpha, Carhart 
four-factor model alpha, and Fung-Hsieh seven-factor model alpha.  All are calculated using monthly fund returns reported in TASS.  
Disclosurei,t is equal to 0 if year t is before the investment company i starts to file form 13F, and is equal to 1 if year t is during the 
period that investment company files form 13F.  
tititititi SizeSizeDisclosureePerformanc ,
2
1,21,1,, εγγβα +⋅+⋅+⋅+= −−  
Sample:  $100million – δ <=Size i,t-1 <= $100million + δ 
Funds that never filed 13F during the sample period are used as a control group for the analysis, and results are reported in model (2), 
(4), (6), (8), and (10). Dummyi,t is equal to 1 if the size of investment company i in year t-1 is equal or greater than $100 million, and is 
equal to 0 otherwise.  
tititititi SizeSizeDummyePerformanc ,
2
1,21,1,, εγγβα +⋅+⋅+⋅+= −−  



<
>=
=
−
−
millionSizeif
millionSizeif
Dummy
ti
ti
ti 100$,0
100$,1
1,
1,
,  
Sample:  $100million – δ <=Size i,t-1 <= $100million + δ 
In Panel B, other thresholds, including $70 million and $130 million, are chosen for the analysis. Specifically, Dummyi,t is equal to 1 if 
the size of investment company i in year t-1 is equal or greater than $70 (or $130) million, and is equal to 0 otherwise. 
tititititi SizeSizeDummyePerformanc ,
2
1,21,1,, εγγβα +⋅+⋅+⋅+= −−  



<
>=
=
−
−
millionorSizeif
millionorSizeif
Dummy
ti
ti
ti )130$(70$,0
)130$(70$,1
1,
1,
,  
Sample:  $70 (or $130 million) – δ <=Sizei,t-1 <= $70 (or $130 million) + δ 
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In Panel C, the performance measure - alpha for investment company i in year t is scaled by the standard error of the alpha estimate.  
These error-scaled alphas are then used in the regression discontinuity (RD) design that is identical to the tests in Panel A.  Similarly, 
the alphas used in Panel D are scaled by their standard errors and the tests are identical to those in Panel B.    
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Panel A.  Funds that Did and Did Not File 13F When Crossing the Threshold of $100 Million 
 
*, **, ***, and ****  denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.   
 
  
 
Raw Return 
 
Market Model Alpha 
 
FF 3-Factor Alpha 
 
Carhart 4-Factor Alpha 
 
Fung-Hsieh 7-Factor Alpha 
 
Test Control 
 
Test Control 
 
Test Control 
 
Test Control 
 
Test Control 
Group Group Group Group Group Group 
 
Group Group Group Group 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
 
(9) (10) 
Disclosure -0.00571 -0.000951 
 
-0.00554** 0.00109 
 
-0.00599** -0.00124 
 
-0.00616** -0.00130 
 
-0.00466* -0.00335 
/Dummy (-1.59) (-0.70) 
 
(-2.26) (0.71) 
 
(-2.78) (-0.62) 
 
(-2.58) (-0.73) 
 
(-1.81) (-1.16) 
Lagged Size  9.93 9.34 
 
-3.31 3.44 
 
-5.98 0.979 
 
-6.87 0.486 
 
-10.1 3.36 
(10-10) (0.56) (1.51) 
 
(-0.42) (1.02) 
 
(-0.93) (0.28) 
 
(-1.02) (0.13) 
 
(-1.40) (0.54) 
Lagged Size2  -5.47 -4.68 
 
1.42 -1.85 
 
2.69 -0.129 
 
3.08 0.159 
 
4.49 -1.2 
(10-18) (-0.60) (-1.47) 
 
(0.35) (-1.03) 
 
(0.83) (-0.07) 
 
(0.89) (0.09) 
 
(1.23) (-0.39) 
Constant -0.0327 -0.0387 
 
0.0250 -0.0128 
 
0.0372 -0.00499 
 
0.0418 -0.00373 
 
0.0597 -0.0166 
 
(-0.39) (-1.23) 
 
(0.66) (-0.78) 
 
(1.21) (-0.29) 
 
(1.30) (-0.19) 
 
(1.68) (-0.53) 
   
 
  
 
     
 
  
Observations 204 796 
 
204 796 
 
204 796 
 
204 796 
 
204 796 
R-squared 0.038 0.005 
  
0.041 0.001 
  
0.064 0.004   0.070 0.003 
  
0.026 0.002 
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Panel B. Other Thresholds ($70 million and $130 million) 
*, **, ***, and ****  denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Raw Return 
  
 Market Model Alpha 
  
FF 3-Factor Alpha 
 
Carhart 4-Factor Alpha 
  
Fung-Hsieh 7-Factor Alpha 
Disclosure 
 
$70 M $130 M 
 
 $70M  $130M 
 
 $70M $130M 
 
$70M $130M 
 
 $70M $130M 
0.0000174 0.00527 0.000401 0.00266 -0.00000908 -0.000747 
 
0.000189 -0.00197 -0.00105 0.00174 
/Dummy (0.01) (1.25) 
 
(0.33) (0.92) 
 
(-0.01) (-0.35) 
 
(0.13) (-0.88) 
 
(-0.43) (0.57) 
Lagged Size  -3.42 -1.07 
 
-1.66 3.52 
 
-1.56 5.64 
 
-1.62 4.23 
 
-0.697 3.46 
(10-10) (-1.23) (-0.17) 
 
(-1.63) (0.63) 
 
(-1.30) (1.03) 
 
(-1.18) (0.75) 
 
(-0.24) (0.60) 
Lagged Size2  2.82 -0.0888 
 
1.24 -1.64 
 
1.25 -2.07 
 
1.26 -1.4 
 
0.947 -1.38 
(10-18) (1.26) (-0.04) 
 
(1.36) (-0.75) 
 
(1.29) (-0.94) 
 
(1.09) (-0.62) 
 
(0.42) (-0.60) 
Constant 0.0153** 0.0191 
 
0.00782*** -0.0156 
 
0.00654 -0.0345 
 
0.00603 -0.0280 
 
0.00323 -0.0189 
 
(2.89) (0.45) 
 
(3.10) (-0.45) 
 
(1.57) (-1.04) 
 
(1.35) (-0.79) 
 
(0.37) (-0.51) 
   
 
  
 
     
 
  
Observations 1500 707 
 
1500 707 
 
1500 707 
 
1500 707 
 
1500 707 
R-squared 0.002 0.005 
 
0.001 0.003 
 
0.001 0.002 
 
0.001 0.003 
 
0.001 0.002 
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Panel C.  Funds that Did and Did Not File 13F When Crossing the Threshold of $100 Million (Error-Scaled) 
  Raw Return   Market Model Alpha   FF 3-Factor Alpha 
 
Carhart 4-Factor Alpha   Fung-Hsieh 7-Factor Alpha 
 
Test Control  Test Control  Test Control 
 
Test Control  Test Control 
Group Group Group Group Group Group 
 
Group Group Group Group 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
 
(9) (10) 
Disclosure -1.381** 0.334  -1.281*** 0.371*  -1.186*** 0.273 
 
-1.236*** 0.287  -1.012*** 0.129 
/Dummy (-2.46) (1.32)  (-3.53) (1.87)  (-3.57) (1.04) 
 
(-3.84) (1.06)  (-3.37) (0.55) 
Lagged Size  -1.94 -10.9  -6.96 -7.93  -11.4 -6.24 
 
-11 -6.76  -3.27 -9.55 
(10-8) (-0.14) (-0.90)  (-0.74) (-0.93)  (-1.44) (-1.00) 
 
(-1.58) (-1.08)  (-0.38) (-1.12) 
Lagged Size2  1.06 5.63  3.69 3.98  6.02 3.14 
 
5.77 3.39  1.6 4.94 
(10-16) (0.14) (0.84)  (0.77) (0.84)  (1.53) (0.90) 
 
(1.62) (0.95)  (0.38) (1.14) 
Constant 3.174 6.748  4.672 4.615  6.418 3.609 
 
6.295* 3.768  2.823 4.953 
 
(0.51) (1.22)  (1.04) (1.22)  (1.67) (1.30) 
 
(1.87) (1.37)  (0.67) (1.17) 
   
 
  
 
     
 
  Observations 204 796  204 796  204 796 
 
204 796  204 796 
R-squared 0.098 0.003   0.129 0.004   0.132 0.003   0.144 0.003   0.069 0.004 
 
*, **, ***, and ****  denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.   
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Panel D.  Other Thresholds ($70 million and $130 million) (Error-Scaled) 
 
*, **, ***, and ****  denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.   
  Raw Return    Market Model Alpha   FF 3- Factor Alpha 
 
Carhart 4-Factor Alpha   Fung-Hsieh 7-Factor Alpha 
Disclosure 
$70 M $130 M 
 
$70 M $130 M 
 
$70 M $130 M 
 
$70 M $130 M 
 
$70 M $130 M 
0.390 -0.127 0.386 -0.318 0.335 -0.317 
 
0.296 -0.357 0.228 -0.159 
/Dummy (1.06) (-0.20)  (1.72) (-0.77)  (1.61) (-0.94) 
 
(1.34) (-0.89)  (0.73) (-0.45) 
Lagged Size  3.95 9.51  1.84 6.2  2.1 5.37 
 
1.88 4.04  3.55 3.31 
(10-8) (0.96) (0.64)  (0.65) (0.58)  (0.75) (0.60) 
 
(0.63) (0.45)  (1.18) (0.38) 
Lagged Size2  -3.11 -3.18  -1.75 -1.98  -1.92 -1.78 
 
-1.73 -1.21  -2.81 -1.01 
(10-16) (-1.00) (-0.58)  (-0.79) (-0.50)  (-0.90) (-0.53) 
 
(-0.79) (-0.36)  (-1.13) (-0.29) 
Constant 0.0636 -4.816  0.0754 -3.420  -0.179 -3.002 
 
-0.180 -2.335  -0.755 -1.820 
 
(0.05) (-0.50)  (0.08) (-0.49)  (-0.19) (-0.51) 
 
(-0.17) (-0.40)  (-0.83) (-0.33) 
   
 
  
 
     
 
  Observations 1500 707  1500 707  1500 707 
 
1500 707  1500 707 
R-squared 0.003 0.001   0.003 0.001   0.003 0.001   0.002 0.001   0.003 0.001 
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 ‘Discontinuous’ Change in Performance When Funds Start to File 13 
The univariate tests in Table 3 show that fund performance is poorer in 
the disclosure periods than in the non-disclosure periods. If the decreased 
performance is due to portfolio disclosure, the change in fund performance 
should not occur slowly over time, but in the form of a sudden drop immediately 
after funds start to file 13F disclosure. In this section, I use the following 
regression to test whether the change in performance occurs as soon as funds 
begin filing 13F:  
2
12,1,5,4
,3,2,1,
54
321
−
+ ⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅
+⋅+⋅+⋅+=
ttiti
th
ti
th
ti
rd
ti
nd
ti
st
ti
SizeinChangeSizeinChangeYear
YearYearYearePerformancinChange
γγββ
βββα
 
Change in Performancei;t is the change in performance of fund family i in 
year t from year t-1. The variable 1st Yeari;t is equal to 1 if it is the first year in 
which the fund family i starts to file 13F. I also include dummy variables for 2nd, 
3rd, and 4th year and for 5th year or later. The control variables include lagged 
change in linear and quadratic term of assets under management. All TASS funds 
except funds that report in a currency other than U.S. dollars are included in the 
analysis, and back-filled data are removed. Fund family and year fixed effects are 
included in the model and errors are clustered. 
As shown in Panel A Table 6, the coefficients on variable 1st Yeari;t are 
negative and statistically significant across all five performance measures. For 
example, the coefficient on variable 1st Yeari;t in model (1) is -0.00523, which 
suggests that the drop in raw returns in the first year after funds start to file 13F is 
0.52% monthly (or 6.3% annually). However, the coefficients on 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 
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5th+ year dummies are not negatively statistically significant. The results suggest 
that the decrease in performance occurs in the first year after funds start to file 
13F, which supports the argument that the drop in performance is due to 13F 
disclosure. The coefficient on lagged change in assets under management is 
negative and statistically significant, which suggests diminishing returns to scale. 
The coefficient on lagged change in squared size is positive, which suggests that 
the relation between performance and size is concave. This discontinuous change 
in performance along the time dimension again lends strong support for the 
argument that portfolio disclosure harms fund performance.  Panel B reports the 
results where the alpha estimates are scaled by its standard error before being 
used in the test.  As discussed in the previous session, this treatment is to address 
the concern that the sample size for estimating alpha in each year is limited (12 
monthly observations).  The results remain unchanged after applying this 
treatment. 
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Table 6. Change in Performance When Funds Start to File 13F 
 
This table reports the results of the following regression model: 
 
2
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Change in Performancei,t is the change in performance of fund family i in year t from year t-1.  The variable 1st Yeari,t 
is equal to 1 if it is the first year since fund family i start to file 13F.  I also include dummy variables for 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 
and 5th year or later. The control variables include lagged change in linear and quadratic term of assets under 
management.  All investment companies that report to the TASS dataset are included in the analysis.  Fund family and 
year fixed effects are included in the model and errors are clustered. The sample period is from June 1990 to February 
2010 after removing the backfilled data.   
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Panel A. Change in Performance When Funds Start to File 13F 
  Change in Alpha 
 
 
Raw Return 
 
 
Market Model  
 
 
FF3 Factor 
 
  
Carhart 4 Factor 
 
 
Fung-Hsieh 7 Factor 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
1st Year  -0.00492* 
 
-0.00432* 
 
-0.00770*** 
 
-0.00818*** 
 
-0.00438* 
 
(-2.02) 
 
(-1.83) 
 
(-3.63) 
 
(-3.63) 
 
(-1.80) 
2nd Year  -0.00247 
 
-0.00323 
 
-0.00215 
 
-0.00255 
 
-0.00282 
 
(-0.75) 
 
(-1.17) 
 
(-0.74) 
 
(-0.69) 
 
(-0.99) 
3rd Year  -0.00243 
 
-0.00278 
 
-0.00334 
 
-0.00195 
 
-0.000343 
 
(-0.87) 
 
(-0.99) 
 
(-0.93) 
 
(-0.38) 
 
(-0.07) 
4th Year  -0.00249 
 
-0.00138 
 
-0.00243 
 
-0.00142 
 
-0.000343 
 
(-0.76) 
 
(-0.52) 
 
(-0.63) 
 
(-0.29) 
 
(-0.05) 
5th+ Year  -0.00209 
 
-0.00299 
 
-0.00571 
 
-0.00492 
 
-0.00508 
 
(-0.65) 
 
(-0.91) 
 
(-1.53) 
 
(-1.19) 
 
(-0.75) 
Lag Change in Size -1.36**** 
 
-0.974**** 
 
-0.835**** 
 
-0.805**** 
 
-0.481*** 
(x 10-11) (-6.16) 
 
(-9.66) 
 
(-7.27) 
 
(-6.69) 
 
(-3.12) 
Lag Change in Size2  7.20**** 
 
5.64**** 
 
4.89**** 
 
4.50**** 
 
3.55*** 
(x 10-22) (6.80) 
 
(8.89) 
 
(5.86) 
 
(5.55) 
 
(4.05) 
Constant 0.0217 
 
0.0171 
 
0.00536 
 
0.0221 
 
0.0437 
 
(1.28) 
 
(0.74) 
 
(0.24) 
 
(1.05) 
 
(1.50) 
          Observations  5383 
 
5383 
 
5383 
 
5383 
 
5382 
R-squared  0.440   0.325   0.267   0.251   0.192 
 
*, **, ***, and ****  denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.   
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Panel B. Change in Performance When Funds Start to File 13F (Error Corrected) 
  Change in Alpha 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
Raw Return Market Model  FF3 Factor Carhart 4 Factor 
Fung-Hsieh 7 
Factor 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
1st Year -0.448* 
 
-0.503** 
 
-0.705*** 
 
-0.799**** 
 
-0.419* 
 
(-1.79) 
 
(-2.57) 
 
(-3.71) 
 
(-4.42) 
 
(-2.03) 
2nd Year -0.409 
 
-0.328 
 
-0.344 
 
-0.322 
 
-0.161 
 
(-1.72) 
 
(-1.39) 
 
(-1.65) 
 
(-1.18) 
 
(-1.04) 
3rd Year 0.0638 
 
-0.00522 
 
0.0789 
 
0.143 
 
0.0821 
 
(0.26) 
 
(-0.02) 
 
(0.35) 
 
(0.43) 
 
(0.50) 
4th Year -0.321 
 
-0.172 
 
-0.210 
 
-0.103 
 
0.0294 
 
(-0.92) 
 
(-0.56) 
 
(-0.70) 
 
(-0.32) 
 
(0.08) 
5th+ Year -0.335 
 
-0.240 
 
-0.433 
 
-0.418 
 
-0.253 
 
(-1.27) 
 
(-0.94) 
 
(-1.44) 
 
(-1.33) 
 
(-0.80) 
Lag Change in Size -1.35**** 
 
-1.08**** 
 
-8.59*** 
 
-7.25*** 
 
-3.45** 
(x 10-10) (-5.56) 
 
(-5.91) 
 
(-3.98) 
 
(-4.05) 
 
(-2.90) 
Lag Change in Size2 7.51**** 
 
6.59**** 
 
5.21*** 
 
4.27*** 
 
2.48*** 
(x 10-20) (5.18) 
 
(5.67) 
 
(3.72) 
 
(3.65) 
 
(3.76) 
Constant 1.472 
 
1.294 
 
0.592 
 
1.602 
 
1.541 
 
(1.07) 
 
(0.84) 
 
(0.41) 
 
(1.14) 
 
(1.03) 
Observations 5382 
 
5383 
 
5383 
 
5383 
 
5382 
R-squared 0.237   0.241   0.199   0.216   0.140 
*, **, ***, and ****  denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.   
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Illiquidity and the Impact of Portfolio Disclosure on Performance 
The findings in the previous sections suggest that 13F portfolio disclosure 
leads to lower hedge fund performance. In this section, I examine the hypothesis 
that the cost of portfolio disclosure should be greater for funds that hold illiquid 
assets. In general, trades in illiquid securities result in larger price impacts than 
trades in liquid securities. In order to reduce the transaction cost caused by price 
impact, fund managers tend to employ sequential trading strategies to accumulate 
or dispose of an illiquid position. However, the longer it takes to accumulate or 
dispose of a position, the higher the likelihood and the greater the cost of being 
taken advantage of by frontrunners and free riders. Consistent with these 
arguments, I find that the drop in performance is more dramatic for funds with 
illiquid holdings. I use the following regression model to test whether the cost of 
disclosure is greater for funds with illiquid holdings: 
2
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Illiquidityi is the average Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure calculated using the 
holdings disclosed in form 13F for fund family i over all disclosing quarters. The 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure is the average daily illiquidity during the 
quarter preceding the 13F filing quarter (where daily illiquidity is calculated as 
the absolute return divided by the dollar trading volume on that day): 
∑
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where IlliqQ is quarterly illiquidity, N is the number of days in the quarter, and rett, 
volt, and prct are the return, trading volume, and the price on day t, respectively. 
As shown in Table 7, the coefficients on the interaction term between 
Illiquidityi and Disclosurei;t are negative across all five models and are 
statistically significant except in models (1). These results suggest that portfolio 
disclosure is more costly for funds that have more illiquid holdings. 
The Impact of 13F Disclosure on Correlations of Hedge Fund Returns 
If portfolio disclosure reveals trade secrets and facilitates free-riding 
activities, we should expect to observe an increase in correlations between the 
returns of fund i and the returns of other hedge funds after fund i starts to file 13F 
disclosure. To measure the correlations between the returns of fund i and other 
hedge funds that are in the same investment style in year t, I regress the monthly 
returns of fund i on the value-weighted returns in year t of all hedge funds that are 
in the same investment style.  The R-squared obtained from this regression 
describes how much of the return variation for fund i can be explained by the 
index returns for all hedge funds that are in the same investment style and is used 
as a measure of correlations between the fund i and other hedge funds that are in 
the same investment style. 
The regression model in column (1) and (2) of Table 8 is: 
tititi DisclosureR ,,1
2
, εβα +⋅+=  
Where Disclosurei;t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if fund i files Form 13F 
in year t, otherwise 0. Advisor fixed effects are included in the models.  The 
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models in column (3) and (4) add control variables including lagged size and 
lagged quadratic terms of size.    
As shown in Table 8, the coefficient on variable Disclosurei;t is positive 
and statistically significant, which indicates that there is an increase in return 
correlations between fund i and other hedge funds that are in the same investment 
style after fund i starts to file the 13F disclosure. The increase in R2 is about 3%, 
which is also economically significant.  These results provide strong evidence that 
there is an increase in return correlations between disclosing funds and other 
hedge funds when funds start to file 13F. These findings support the argument 
that portfolio disclosure reveals trade secrets and facilitates free-riding activities.
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Table 7. Illiquidity and the Impact of Portfolio Disclosure on Hedge Fund Performance   
 
This table reports the results of the following regression model:  
 
2
1,21,12,1,, )(loglog −− ⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅⋅+⋅+= tititiititi SizeSizeyIlliquiditDisclosureyIlliquiditDisclosureePerformanc ββγγβα  
 
Illiquidityi,t is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure calculated based on the holdings disclosed in 13F.  The Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity measure is calculated as the average daily illiquidity during the quarter preceding the 13F filing 
quarter (where daily illiquidity is calculated as the absolute return divided by the dollar trading volume on that day): 
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where IlliqQ is quarterly illiquidity, N is the number of days in the quarter,  rett, volt, and prct are the daily return, 
trading volume, and the price on day t, respectively.   
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    Raw   
Alpha  
(Market Model)    
Alpha  
(FF3 Factors)    
Alpha  
(Carhart 4 Factors)    
Alpha 
 (FT7 Factors) 
  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
Disclosure 
 
-0.0178 
 
-0.0283* 
 
-0.0332** 
 
-0.0270** 
 
-0.0274* 
  
(-1.01) 
 
(-2.22) 
 
(-2.85) 
 
(-2.51) 
 
(-2.23) 
Lagged log Size 
 
-0.00469*** 
 
-0.00347 
 
-0.00188 
 
-0.00113 
 
-0.000485 
  
(-4.07) 
 
(-1.72) 
 
(-0.48) 
 
(-0.32) 
 
(-0.14) 
Lagged (log Size)2 
 
0.000119*** 
 
0.0000900 
 
0.0000511 
 
0.0000281 
 
0.0000256 
  
(4.21) 
 
(1.86) 
 
(0.51) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.30) 
Disclosure x Illiquidity 
 
-0.000777 
 
-0.00126* 
 
-0.00149** 
 
-0.00119* 
 
-0.00126* 
  
(-0.97) 
 
(-2.07) 
 
(-2.72) 
 
(-2.34) 
 
(-2.17) 
Illiquidity 
 
0.000820 
 
0.000998 
 
0.00122** 
 
0.00104** 
 
0.00108* 
  
(1.36) 
 
(1.86) 
 
(3.43) 
 
(2.68) 
 
(2.27) 
Constant 
 
0.0802*** 
 
0.0602** 
 
0.0525 
 
0.0429 
 
0.0379 
  
(4.02) 
 
(2.55) 
 
(1.38) 
 
(1.28) 
 
(1.00) 
           Observations 
 
534 
 
534 
 
534 
 
534 
 
534 
R-squared   0.182   0.053   0.057   0.060   0.117 
 
*, **, ***, and ****  denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.   
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Table 8. The Impact of 13F Disclosure on the Correlations of Hedge Fund Returns  
 
The regression model in the table below is:  
tititi DisclosureR ,,1
2
, εβα +⋅+=  
where 2,tiR  is the R-squared from regressing monthly returns of fund family i on the value-weighted returns of hedge 
funds in the same style in year t.  Disclosurei,t is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if fund family i files Form 13F in 
year t, otherwise 0.   Fund fixed effects are included in the model.  
 
  R-squared 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Disclosure 0.0348*** 0.0218* 0.0347** 0.0333** 
 
(2.77) (1.72) (2.48) (2.35) 
Lag log Size 
  
-0.0500** -0.0446** 
   
(-2.26) (-2.05) 
Lag log Size2 
  
0.00235**** 0.00185*** 
   
(3.66) (2.93) 
Constant 0.419**** 0.441**** 0.553*** 0.914*** 
 
(143.76) (4.11) (2.85) (3.19) 
     Year Dummy No Yes No Yes 
     Observations 13571 13571 11175 11175 
R-squared 0.001 0.077 0.014 0.068 
*, **, ***, and ****  denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.   
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The Impact of 13F Disclosure on Compensation Schemes 
Since portfolio disclosure allows more monitoring of fund activity, it 
introduces another mechanism to control the agency problem. Though agency 
theories have rich implications for how monitoring may interact with the fund 
manager's compensation incentives, the impact of disclosure on optimal 
compensation is still a rarely explored empirical question in the literature. The 
typical compensation in the hedge fund industry includes a management fee that 
is a fixed percentage of assets and an incentive fee that is a percentage of the 
profit when a fund return is positive or exceeds a “high-water mark”.  This 
incentive fee aligns the interest of managers with that of investors. However, such 
option-like fee structures also provide managers with an incentive to take 
investment risks that exceed investors' desired risk level. Investors with 
information about a portfolio's holdings are better able to assess the risk they are 
exposed to, a circumstance that disciplines risk taking by fund managers. 
Portfolio disclosure thereby reduces the cost of option-like incentive fees and 
allows for higher incentive fees in the optimal compensation structure. 
Though TASS only provides a snapshot of the fee structure of each 
reporting fund, the inception date of each fund tells whether the fee structure was 
set before or during the period that the fund family filed 13F disclosure. Because 
fund fees are set at the time of the inception of the fund, I compare the fees of the 
funds launched during the period that their fund families file 13F with the fees of 
the funds launched before 13F disclosure. In the previous section, the analysis of 
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the impact of portfolio disclosure on hedge fund performance is conducted at the 
fund family level. In this section, the analysis is conducted at the fund level. 
 Summary Statistics on Hedge Fund Compensation Schemes 
Table 9 provides summary statistics on hedge fund compensation schemes, 
including incentive fees, management fees, and whether funds use a high-water 
mark. Funds of funds are excluded from the sample because their fee structures 
are different. Funds that launched after their fund family stopped filing form 13F 
are also excluded. Panel A reports and compares compensation schemes for non-
13F filers and 13F filers. Similar to the definition earlier, non-13F filers refers to 
funds that never filed 13F during the sample period and 13F filers refers to funds 
that belong to a fund family that filed a 13F at least once. As shown in Panel A of 
Table 8, the average incentive fee for 13F filers is 18.92% and for non-13F filers 
is 18.16%. Thus, the incentive fees for 13F filers are 0.76% greater than for non-
13F filers, and the difference is statistically significant. The average management 
fee for both 13F filers and non-13F filers is 1.50%. The percentage of funds that 
use a high-water mark for 13F filers is 67% and for non-13F filers is 84%. The 
difference is 17% and is statistically significant. Panel B reports and compares the 
compensation scheme for funds that launched before their fund families started to 
file 13F and for funds that launched during the period that their fund families filed 
13F.  The univariate test shows that funds that launched during the 13F filing 
have higher incentive fees (0.56%, but not statistically significant) and use a high-
water mark more frequently.  However, such univariate tests cannot control for 
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other factors, such as time trends, that might have affected the compensation 
scheme. I show the results of multivariate tests in the next section. 
The Impact of 13F Disclosure on Compensation Schemes 
I  use  the  following  multivariate  regression  to  capture  the  effect  of  
disclosure  on  incentive fees: 
iii FamilyAgetsFamilyAsseDisclosureFeeIncentive εγγβα +⋅+⋅+⋅+= 21
 
where the dependent variable is incentive fees as a percentage term.  The variable 
Disclosurei is equal to 1 if the fee structure is set during the period that a fund 
family files 13F, and is equal to 0 if the fee structure is set in the period before the 
fund family starts to file 13F. The control variables include the fund family's 
assets under management and family age (in log form) at the fund's inception date, 
and a dummy variable that indicates whether the fund family has ever filed a 13F 
report. Year, fund category, and fund family fixed effects are included in the 
models and errors are clustered. 
As shown in columns (1) to (5) of Table 10, the coefficients on 
Disclosurei are positive and statistically significant. The incentive fees are on 
average about 1 % higher when a fund family files 13F portfolio disclosure. In 
unreported tables, I find that there is no change in the management fee or the use 
of a high-water mark after funds file the 13F disclosure. Overall, these results 
support the hypothesis that portfolio monitoring reduces risk-taking by fund 
managers and allows for higher convexity in the optimal compensation structure.
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Table 9.  Summary Statistics on Hedge Fund Compensation  
 
This table provides summary statistics on hedge fund compensation schemes, including incentive fees, management 
fees, and whether funds use a high-water mark.  Funds of funds and funds that launched after their fund family stopped 
filing form 13F are excluded from the sample.  Panel A reports and compares compensation schemes for non-13F filers 
and 13F filers.  Non-13F filers refer to funds that never filed 13F during the sample period and 13F filers refers to 
funds that belong to a fund family that filed 13F at least once.  Panel B reports and compares the compensation scheme 
for funds that launched before their fund families started to file 13F and for funds that launched during the period that 
their fund families filed 13F.   
 
Panel A.  Non-13 Filers and 13F Filers 
       Non-13F Filers  13F Filers  Difference 
       N Mean p50 Sd Min Max  N Mean p50 Sd Min Max  13F-Non13F 
Incentive Fee (%)       6248 18.16 20 5.89 0 50  450 18.92 20 4.20 0 25  0.76 *** 
Management Fee (%)       6254 1.50 1.5 0.66 0 10  450 1.50 1.5 0.61 0 4  0.00  
High-Water Mark       6254 0.67 1 0.47 0 1  450 0.84 1 0.37 0 1  0.17 **** 
Lockup Dummy       6265 0.25 0 0.43 0 1  451 0.42 0 0.49 0 1  0.17 **** 
Family Assets ($ million)       4968 209 0 672 0 20134  405 526 137 1000 0 5775  316 **** 
Family Age (month)       6012 33 9 48 1 353  442 59 46 54 1 183  26 **** 
 
Panel B.  Before and During 13F Filing 
       Launched Before 13F Filing  Launched During 13F Filing  Difference 
       N Mean p50 Sd Min Max  N Mean p50 Sd Min Max  During-Before 
Incentive Fee (%)       208 18.61 20 4.49 0 25  242 19.18 20 3.93 0 25  0.56  
Management Fee (%)       208 1.49 1.5 0.66 0 4  242 1.50 1.5 0.56 0 4  0.01  
High-Water Mark       208 0.77 1 0.42 0 1  242 0.90 1 0.30 0 1  0.13 **** 
Lockup Dummy       208 0.40 0 0.49 0 1  243 0.44 0 0.50 0 1  0.04  
Family Assets($ million)       178 390 25 1031 0 5580  227 632 272 963 0 5775  242  
Age (month)       202 40 24 46 1 167  240 75 73 55 1 183  35   
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Table 10. The Impact of 13F Disclosure on Hedge Fund Compensation Schemes 
 
This table reports the results of regressing hedge fund incentive fee on variable Disclosurei that indicates whether its 
fund family files 13F disclosure at fund i’s inception. Control variables include assets under management and the age 
of fund family at fund i’s inception.  Fund’s investment style, fund family, and inception year fixed effects are included 
in the model and errors are clustered.  
 
  Incentive Fees 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Disclosure 1.169* 1.097* 1.164** 1.159** 0.996* 
 
(1.91) (1.84) (2.65) (2.66) (1.69) 
log Family Assets 
  
-0.00979 -0.152** 0.0457 
   
(-0.10) (-2.46) (0.56) 
log Family Age 
  
-0.212** 
 
-0.152 
   
(-2.41) 
 
(-1.03) 
Constant 21.14**** 19.17**** -1.574** -1.475** 14.54**** 
 
(116.69) (20.80) (-2.51) (-2.45) (12.56) 
      
Fund Style Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Family Dummy  Yes Yes No No Yes 
Inception Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 6698 6698 5359 5360 5359 
R-squared 0.031 0.038 0.069 0.068 0.043 
*, **, ***, and ****  denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.   
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The Impact of 13F Disclosure on Fund Flows 
Whether hedge fund investors value 13F portfolio disclosure is still an 
open question. While investors may prefer more disclosure for the increased 
transparency it affords, they may prefer less disclosure if disclosure hampers the 
performance of the funds. In addition, it is possible for hedge fund investors to 
negotiate directly with fund managers to obtain portfolio information privately. 
The value that investors attach to the 13F disclosure can be measured by the fund 
flows in and out of the funds, after controlling for other factors that affect flows 
(e.g., past performance). 
Flows for fund family i in year t are calculated as the changes in assets 
under management from year end t-1 to year end t after removing the changes in 
assets caused by returns in year t and then divided by assets under management at 
year end t-1: 
1,
,1,,
,
Re
−
− ⋅−=
ti
tititi
ti ManagementUnderAssets
turnsManagementUnderAssetsManagementUnderAssets
Flow
 
Variable Flowi;t is winsorized at upper  90%  to  remove  the  effect  of  extreme  
outliers.  As shown in Panel A of Table 11, the average flow for non-13F filers is 
5.6% per year and for 13F filers is 13.2% per year. The difference is 7.7%, which 
is statistically significant. The average flow for 13F filers before 13F filing is 36.1% 
per year and is 2.8% per year during the period of 13F filings. The difference is 
33.2%, which is statistically significant. Therefore, the univariate analysis 
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suggests that fund flows are lower in the disclosure period than in the non-
disclosure period. 
Since there are factors other than disclosure that can also affect fund flows, 
I use the following multivariate regression models to examine how fund flows 
respond to 13F disclosure: 
1,,, −⋅+⋅+= tititi ControlsDisclosureFlow γβα  
The control variables include lagged performance, lagged volatility of 
fund returns, lagged assets under management in log form, a lockup dummy 
indicating whether the fund utilizes the lockup provision, and the 13F Filing 
Funds Dummy variable indicating whether the fund family ever filed 13F in the 
sample period. As shown in Panel B Table 11, the coefficient on Disclosurei is 
negative and statistically significant across all models, which indicates that flows 
are lower during the disclosure period. For example, model (1) suggests that the 
flows in the disclosure period are 14% lower per year than in the non-disclosure 
period. The coefficient on lagged performance is positive, which is consistent 
with the idea that flow chases past performance (Berk and Green, 2004). The 
coefficient on past fund volatility is negative, which suggests that hedge fund 
investors dislike return volatility. Overall, the results indicate that flows are lower 
in the periods of disclosure than in non-disclosure periods, suggesting that hedge 
fund investors place a negative value on 13F portfolio disclosure.
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Table 11.The Impact of 13F Disclosure on Fund Flows 
 
Panel A of this table reports the summary statistics and univariate tests of flows 1) for the 13F filers and the non-13F 
filers, and 2) for the 13F filers in the period before they began filing form 13F and in the period during which they filed 
form 13F. 
 
Panel B reports the results of the panel regression below:  
 
1,,, −⋅+⋅+= tititi ControlsDisclosureFlow γβα  
 
Where    
1,
,1,,
,
Re
−
− ⋅−=
ti
tititi
ti ManagementUnderAssets
turnManagementUnderAssetsManagementUnderAssets
Flow  
Flowi,t is the flow in or out of investment company i during year t, defined as the formula above.  Disclosurei,t  is equal 
to 1 if investment company i files a 13F disclosure in year t.  Control variables include lagged performance, lagged 
volatility of fund returns, lagged assets under management in log form, a lockup dummy indicating whether funds 
utilize lockup provisions, and a 13F Filing Funds Dummy indicating whether the investment company i has ever filed 
13F in the sample period.  Model (1) to (5) differs in how lagged performance is measured.  Year fixed effects are 
included and errors are clustered at the investment company level.  
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Panel A.  Univariate test on Fund Flows 
 
Non-13F Filers   13F Filers   Difference 
n mean median sd 
 
n mean median sd 
 
13F-Non13F 
2058 0.056 0.017 0.323 
 
296 0.132 0.112 0.284 
 
0.077 **** 
Before 13F Filing 
 
During 13F Filing 
 
Difference 
n mean median sd 
 
n mean median sd 
 
13F-Non13F 
157 0.361 0.36 0.437   285 0.028 -0.01 0.313   -0.332 **** 
 
*, **, ***, and ****  denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.   
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Panel B. The Impact of 13F Disclosure on Fund Flows 
 
Control variable "Lag Performance" is measured by 
 Raw   
Alpha  
  
Alpha  
  
Alpha  
  
Alpha 
 
(Market Model)  (FF3 Factors)  (Carhart 4 Factors)   (FT7 Factors) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
Disclosure -0.0998*** 
 
-0.0963*** 
 
-0.102*** 
 
-0.102*** 
 
-0.118*** 
 
(-2.74) 
 
(-2.62) 
 
(-2.71) 
 
(-2.71) 
 
(-3.12) 
Lag Performance 8.743**** 
 
10.09**** 
 
5.316**** 
 
4.836**** 
 
1.120*** 
 
(7.09) 
 
(7.13) 
 
(3.46) 
 
(3.78) 
 
(2.96) 
Lag Size -0.0332**** 
 
-0.0323**** 
 
-0.0283*** 
 
-0.0270*** 
 
-0.0249*** 
 
(-3.72) 
 
(-3.65) 
 
(-3.27) 
 
(-3.12) 
 
(-2.89) 
Lag Volatility -2.057*** 
 
-2.080*** 
 
-1.801** 
 
-1.680** 
 
-1.896** 
 
(-3.03) 
 
(-2.97) 
 
(-2.31) 
 
(-2.25) 
 
(-2.53) 
Fund Family Age -0.0285**** 
 
-0.0275**** 
 
-0.0267**** 
 
-0.0273**** 
 
-0.0284**** 
 
(-5.13) 
 
(-5.04) 
 
(-4.71) 
 
(-4.83) 
 
(-4.91) 
Lockup -0.00620 
 
-0.00818 
 
-0.00404 
 
-0.00186 
 
-0.00175 
 
(-0.20) 
 
(-0.27) 
 
(-0.13) 
 
(-0.06) 
 
(-0.05) 
Constant 1.032**** 
 
1.091**** 
 
1.048**** 
 
1.029**** 
 
1.021**** 
 
(5.03) 
 
(5.24) 
 
(4.96) 
 
(4.86) 
 
(4.73) 
Observations 1254 
 
1254 
 
1254 
 
1254 
 
1254 
R-squared 0.190   0.188   0.155   0.152   0.137 
*, **, ***, and ****  denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.   
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study contributes to the policy debate over the optimal portfolio 
disclosure policy by providing direct evidence that portfolio disclosure leads to a 
decline in hedge fund performance. The cost of portfolio disclosure to hedge fund 
performance is economically large (4% annually), suggesting that there is a need 
to improve the current form of mandatory portfolio disclosure. For example, 
requiring less frequent disclosures or longer delay periods might deter free-riding 
activities and reduce the costs of portfolio disclosure. Another alternative would 
be to make hedge fund disclosure reports available only to each fund's investors 
and to regulatory agencies. In addition, although part of the purpose of mandatory 
portfolio disclosure is to protect hedge fund investors, it is noteworthy that 
investment flows drop following disclosure, suggesting that hedge fund investors 
find disclosure undesirable. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table 11. Probit Analysis on the Likelihood that Firm Files 13F Filing 
This table reports the results from a Probit regression that predicts the likelihood 
of a firm begins to file 13F in the next three years. The dependent variable is 
equal to one if the firm begins to file 13F in the next three years, otherwise zero.  
The coefficients, t-statistics (in parenthesis), and the marginal effects (in Italic) 
for each Probit model are presented.     
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Raw MktModel FF3Model Carhart4 Fung-Hsieh7 
Historical Performance 3.253 0.577** 1.893**** -1.156 0.0241 
 
(1.52) (2.38) (3.65) (-1.36) (0.04) 
 
0.474 0.0840** 0.273**** -0.169 0.00354 
Performance in year t 5.230** 4.626* 2.474 2.856 -0.377 
 
(2.38) (1.96) (1.29) (1.50) (-0.30) 
 
0.762** 0.673** 0.357 0.418 -0.0555 
Size 0.131**** 0.133**** 0.134**** 0.134**** 0.133**** 
 
(6.81) (6.93) (7.00) (7.02) (6.96) 
 
0.0191**** 0.0193**** 0.0193**** 0.0197**** 0.0195**** 
Historical Volatility 1.148 1.362 1.382 1.140 1.517 
 
(0.76) (0.90) (0.91) (0.76) (1.02) 
 
0.167 0.198 0.199 0.167 0.223 
Volatility in year t -1.047 -0.491 -0.226 0.230 -0.231 
 
(-0.61) (-0.29) (-0.14) (0.14) (-0.14) 
 
-0.153 -0.0715 -0.0326 0.0336 -0.0340 
Age -0.0209 -0.0200 -0.0186 -0.0208 -0.0212 
 
(-1.48) (-1.42) (-1.32) (-1.48) (-1.50) 
 
-0.00304 -0.00291 -0.00269 -0.00304 -0.00311 
Lockup 0.157** 0.174** 0.161** 0.172** 0.174** 
 
(2.19) (2.44) (2.24) (2.40) (2.44) 
 
0.0244** 0.0273** 0.0248** 0.0270** 0.0275** 
Flow in year t 0.165** 0.189*** 0.181*** 0.200*** 0.209**** 
 
(2.57) (2.99) (2.86) (3.17) (3.34) 
 
0.0241*** 0.0275*** 0.0261*** 0.0292*** 0.0307**** 
Constant -3.778**** -3.790**** -3.818**** -3.799**** -3.767**** 
 
(-10.57) (-10.62) (-10.69) (-10.66) (-10.60) 
      Observation 3725 3725 3725 3725 3723 
 
*, **, ***, and ****  denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent 
level, respectively.  
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APPENDIX B 
Table 12. The Impact of Portfolio Disclosure on Hedge Fund Risk 
 
This table reports the impact of portfolio disclosure on hedge fund risk.  The 
dependent variable is the risk of fund i in year t, which is measured by the 
volatility of the returns of fund i in year t. Disclosurei,t  is equal to 1 if fund i filed 
Form 13F in year t, otherwise 0.  Control variables include lagged log(size) and 
squared term of lagged log(size). Year fixed effects are included in the model.      
 
 Fund Risk Fund Risk 
 (1) (2) 
Disclosure 0.000463 -0.000444 
 
(0.39) (-0.33) 
Lagged logSize 
 
-0.00889** 
  
(-2.05) 
Lagged (logSize)2 
 
0.000263** 
  
(2.16) 
Constant 0.0281**** 0.0966** 
 
(3.40) (2.52) 
  Year Dummy Yes Yes 
   Observations 17848 14262 
R-squared 0.204 0.201 
 
*, **, ***, and ****  denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent 
level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
